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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IS TllE i\IA'J1'l'ER OF 
THE ~S'l1ATE OF l 
\YILLIAl\l PAXMAN, Deeea:::;e<l j 
Case No. 
10565 
BHU~l<' OF RESPONDENT AND 
CROSS-APPELLANT 
V l VIAN T. PAXMAN, EXEC UTRlX 
S'l1..·\'11El\IEK'l1 OF NATURE OF CASE 
'11he ap1Jeal in this case is from an order of the Dis-
trict Court approving inheritance tax return and fixing 
amount of inheritance tax. The '11ax Commission appealed 
from that part of the order interpreting the will of the 
d<>cedent and fixing the amount of inheritance tax. The 
respondent executrix then cross-appealed from that part 
of the order fixing inheritance tax in the amount of 
$Sti9.1 () in:::;tl•ad of $521.±9 as claimed by the executrix in 
lier return. 
RELIEF SOUGH'l1 BY RESPONDENT 
AND CROSS-APPELLANT 
'l11ie l'l':::llJondent and cross-appellant contends that the 
<:ourt':::; finding:::; and order on interpretation of the will 
of deceased and deductions to be allowed were correct 
and should be approved, but contends that the court 
Pl'lWi in ib interpretation of Section 59-12-2 Utah Code 
J ~13;~ relating to rate of tax and that the amount of tax 
1 
as set forth in the exel'.utrix's i11l1eritanl'.e tax n~tun 
towit $521.±9, is correct instead of $SG9.1G as fi.,xed IJ: 
the court. 
~'11A'l1EME~\'l' OF FACT~ 
Appellant'8 Brief 8et8 forth in full the Last Will anu 
Testament of \Villiarn Paxman, deeeased, al8o the "At 
ceptance of ~L1estarnentary Prnvisions" filed by the wid011 
(executrix.), and the sections of the G tah Code involVL'u 
in the appeal and cros8-aypeal. J{epetition herein i~ 
deemed to be unnecessary. Appellant failed to 8tate 11011 
ever that the executrix's inheritance tax return was suli 
rnitted to the Tax Commission prior to the filing o.f hc1 
petition for approval of same by the court and that the 
Commission, through its auditor, disallowed the wido1r'1 
claim of deduction for her statutory interest in real 
estate. This action was set forth in paragraph 9 of her 
petition to the court. (R 13-15) 
ARGUMENT 
As a preliminary to its argument on interpretation 
of the decedent's will, the Tax Commission on pagef 
5 and 6 of its brief appears to complain of the fact that 
the District Court took primary jurisdiction of the case 
and acted upon the executrix's Petition for Order Ap-
proving Inheritance Tax Return and Fixing Inheritance 
Tax "without giving the Commission the preliminary 
right to make an initial determination of the appro-
priateness of such a return on the basis of its exper 
ience and expertise in this area.'' 'l'he point was urgrd 
by counsel for the Commission before the trial court and 
argument made that the exeeutrix had failed to exhau~t 
2 
i1f'!' ad111inistrative remedies. 'l'his was answered by re-
J'\'l't:nce to Section 59-12-:35 of the Inheritance 'rax Act 
\I hl('h specifically provides that: 
"'l'he district court liaving either principal or 
ancillary jurisdiction of the settlement of the 
<•state of a decedent shall have jurisdiction to hear 
and determine all <1uestions in relation to said tax 
that may arise affecting any devise, legacy or in-
heritance, or any grant or gift, or any transfer of 
tith~ by right of survivornhip, under this chapter, 
subject to right o.f appeal as in other cases, and 
the State 'fax Commission shall represent the in-
terests of the state in any such proceedings." 
~ince the petition filed by the executrix (R. 13-15) 
rvcites in paragraph 9 that the Inheritance 'fax Return 
had been submitted to the Tax Commission and approved 
by it except for the item herein in dispute, it was obvi-
ously proper for the court to take jurisdiction of the 
lllatter 'without calling for further consideration by the 
l'ornmission. And it ought not to be assumed that the 
District Court's experience and expertise in the area of 
interpretation of wills and statutes is inferior to· that 
of the 'l'ax Commission. In any event the section above 
(1uoted gives the court and not the Tax Commission orig-
inal jurisdiction and duty to hear and determine the 
questions here involved. 'l'he suggestion made by counsel 
that the <:~xecutrix had failed to exhaust her administra-
t1Y<· n·mt>dies bdore presenting her petition to the court 
!'or an order approving the inheritance tax return and 
fi)._ing the amount of tax is \\'ithout merit. '11he Inheri-
tanc<' Tax Act is entirely unlil:e tlw Sales Tax Act (Chap-
lt'r lS of 'l'itlc 59) an<l l'sc rl'ax Act (1Chapter 10, Title 
3 
.)!} ) , each if whieh provide that the Tax l'ouuuission shall 
conduct hearings and maim determinations and that ib 
decisions shall he final unless an appeal is taken to tlH· 
~uprerne Court within thirty days. 
ln ~ection 59-12-35 supra, tht~ Legi:slature has fixed 
the role of the '1'ax Connnis:sion with i·ef erenee to inheri-
tance taxes as that of partisan advocate for the state and 
not judge. ln this ease the zeal and tenacity of the Com-
mission in contending for a strained and mueasonabl~ 
interpretation of the testator's will and applicable stat-
utory provisions relating thereto shows that it is not 
shirking its duty a:s such advocate and that it is sparing 
no effort to collect for the state the highest possible rate 
and amount of inheritance tax. 
AN8WER TO APPELLANrris POINTS I AND II 
Section 74-4-3 Utah Code 1953 expressly gives to a 
surviving wife a one-third interest in real property pos-
sessed by the husband at any time during the marriage 
to which the wife has made no relinquishment of her 
rights, and further provides that such one-third interest 
shall be set apart as her property in fee simple, if she 
survives him. Section 7 4-4-4 provides that if the husband 
shall make any provision by will for the ··widow, such 
provision shall be deemed to be in lieu of the distributive 
share secured by Section 7 ±-4-3 unless it shall appear 
from the will that the decedent designed the testamentary 
provisions to be additional to such distributive share, in 
which case the widow shall be presumed to have accepted 
both such tPstanwntary provisions and such distributive 
share. 
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I u thi::; ca8e the widow ha8 not at any time made any 
1·elinquishment of her :..;tatutory right under 8ection 
74-4-3. On the contrary, 8he filed a written acceptance of 
the provi8ions of the will (HA) and therein expressly 
claimed her one-third interest in real estate under that 
section and also claimed her right to receive all other 
property left by decedent, pursuant to the provision::; of 
Uw will. 
H.e8pondent submits that a fair reading of the will 
indubitably shows that it was the intention of the testa-
tor to give to his wife all of hi::; property and without any 
intention to require her to renounce or relinquish the 
right given her by statute to one-third of real estate 
possessed by him during the marriage. This was sub-
mitted to the trial court in a request for a special finding 
by the court upon the following question: 
"Does it appear from the language of the will of 
~William Paxman that he intended to devise and 
bequeath all of his property to his wife, in case 
she survived him, without any requirement that 
she renounce or relinquish whatever right or in-
terest was given her by law in real estate acquired 
by him during the marriage~" 
The Court'::; affinnative finding upon that question 
is shown in the paragraph numbered 1 of the order ap-
pealed from herein, as set forth on page 3 of Appellant's 
Brief towit : 
' 
"l. That the testator, William Paxman, intended 
to and did provide by his will that his wife, if she 
survived him, have all of his estate, and without 
requiring her to relinquish her statutory right to 
one-third of the real estate, and that such inten-
tion appears from the will of the deceased." 
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Hespondent subwits that 110 other ans\\-i•r to tlH 
l:J,bove question can reasonably be given. The will is siw 
ple, concise and unambiguous. It unmistakably show~ 
a desire on the part of the testator to give his wife all 
of his property without any desire to have her forego h('J 
statutory right in real estate, or to eo11qJel her to pay ad-
ditional inheritanee tax by renunciation of her right in 
such real estate. Counsel for the Commission argues that 
the in·ovision in the will reeiting that the omission tn 
provide for testatm's children is intentional and not 
oceasioned by accident or mistake is "'irrelevant.'' 8urely 
such argument will not be persuasive. The dechration 
in the will that the omission to provide for his children 
was intentional adds to proof, if additional proof is ne-
cessary, that it was the clear and deliberate desire oJ 
testator to give to his wife all property of which he had 
po\ver to devise or bequeath, and \\-ithout compelling 
her to choose between the will and her statutory right. 
In that connection \Ve should consider \vhat would hav~ 
been the effect of the alternative choices. 
(a) If the widow had chosen to take under the will, 
would there have been any effect other than to compel 
payment of additional inheritance and estate tax 1 \Y ould 
the testator have intended that! 
( b) If the widow had elt>cted to renoUIH.'e the will and 
take her statutory one-third of real estate, where would 
the balance of property go'( To children who were ex-
pressly cut off by the will! Or to the ,,-idO\Y and children'! 
And with additional tax burd.Pn? Did the testator inttind 
such a result'? 
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l t ap1wars to Lie the oviuiou of the 'l'ax Couml.issiou 
that the only way for a testator to provide for hi::; sur-
\'iving wifl, to get both her statutory right and the ben-
pfit of a will is for the will to· provide in express words 
that the provisions for the wife in the will are in addition 
to the right given her by Section 7+-4-3 Utah Code Anno-
tatPd. Yet counsel for the Commission admits on page 
9 and again on page 18 of his brief that such a construc-
tion of the statute "may create a situation where two 
wives. equally loved and cared for by their husbands 
might receive through his will the same amount of prop-
erty, with one getting a substantial tax break over the 
other simply because one husband had better legal advice 
than the other, and inserted in his will a statement to the 
effect that its provisions were in addition to the statutory 
share under Section 74-4-3." Respondent submits that in 
interpreting wills or other documents the courts look 
to the substance of things and do not arbitrarily require 
a particular word or phrase to be used, where the inten-
tion of the signer is plainly discernible from the lan-
guage used. 
In this case the trial court in its original Memor-
andum Decision dated October 21, 1965 (R. 19a) and in 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order 
Approving Inheritance Tax Return and Fixing Inheri-
tance Tax (R. 16-17) and in its final order amending 
the original order (R. 29-30) and in the accompanying 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 25-28) m 
l'ach instance specifically found: 
"That the testator, William Paxman, intended to 
and did provide by his will that his wife, if she 
7 
~urvived lti.m, !rn.ve all of hi::; estate, and witJwul 
re'JUiring her to relinquish her statutory right tf' 
on.e-t!lird of the real esfa.t,97 and that such inten-
tion appe2.ni from the witH of the deceased." 
The court thereupon rightly concluded that the ~rnrviving 
wife hatl the right to cfa.im and receive under the pro 
visions of Section 7 4-4:-3 mie-third of real estate described 
in the inh~::rit&nce tax retuxn) \\'ithout renouncing the will 
of deceased1 &ncl also had the right to receive all other 
property left by deceased without relinquishing her rig11t 
under the st3tute to cJ.~im one-third of real estate re-
ferred to. 
Jn itt:J zeal to recover additional taxe::; the 'l1ax Uom-
mil"sion argues that it b:J.s been Hs practice and policy to 
deny the right of a widow to take both under the will and 
uri.der the sta,tute unless the husband clearly and unequiv-
ocally states in his will that its provisions for the widow 
are additio,nal to her distrib1ittive sha·re u!Ylder the statute. 
(Emphi'.l .. sis added) It then argues that this practice and 
policy should he :recognized by the con.rt and given effect 
in i::nterp.retiio.g the provisions of Section 7 4-4-3 and 
7 4-4-4. Resp<0ndent submits that this is reading into a 
plain and l.m.runbiguous statute a meaning never intended 
by the Legisle,ture and thB.t the court will be abdicating 
its responsibility if it allows such a practice of an admin-
istrative &gen.cy to control or influence its decision herein. 
The st~t·:i.te does not say that the !msband must state in 
his will that its p:rovisions are "in addition to the dis· 
tribuive share nrcvided bv Section 7 4--±-3." 1t does not 
-'- ')I 
say that it must "clea:dy and unambiguously" or "spe· 
cifically and unequivocally" appear from the will that it8 
8 
pru\'1~iuJ1~ fo.r the wife are in addition to h~r ~tatutury 
111 1;1!*. What Sedion 7-!--1-+ does say is simply: 
"H the husband shall make any provision by the 
w iH for the widow, such provision shall be deemed 
to be in lieu of the distributive share secured by 
the next preceding section7 unless it shall appear 
from the will that the decedent designed the testa-
mentary provision to be additional to such dis-
tribuhve share, in which case the widow shall be 
presumed to have accepted both such testamen-
tary µrovisions and such distributive share." 
Can any judicial tribunal say that there is any call 
for rd'l•rence to administrative pr<ictice of the ta)( col-
1Pcting- agency in interpreting J.'\, concise and unambiguous 
will such as that lwrein involved in which the testator 
drdares: 
"l hereby devjse and bequeath unto my beloved 
wife Vivian T. Paxman, all my property and 
estate, both real and personal, of whatsoever na-
ture or when•soever situated, to have and to hold 
tlw same absolutely. 
l hereby nominate and appoint my beloved 
wife, Vivian T. Pax1m1.n, the executrix of this my 
last will and testament, and direct that she serve 
as such executrix withov.t bond. 
l hereby declare that my omission to provide 
herein for my children is intentional and not 
occasioned by any ac~ident or mistal{e, and it is 
my desire ~,nd will that my children now living 
and also any of my children which may be born 
hereafter i;hall not share in my estate." 
Will the court justify the Tax Conunission in contending 
that there ii' nut shown in this will a clear and unarnbig-
9 
uou:s and une(1uivoeal intentwn 011 the part of the te:sta-
tor to give all pro11erty which he had power to devise or 
bequeath to his wife if she survived him - and without 
any requirement that she renounce that which the statute 
gave her a8 an absolute right in lieu of dower in case she 
survived him 1 
Coun:sel for the Connni8sion cite8 in support of it8 
contention herein the ca8es of In Re Osgood's Estate 52 
Utah 185, 173 Pac. 152 and In Re Kohn's Estate, 56 Utah 
17, 187 Pac. 409. The Osgood ca8e is clearly not in point. 
In it the will of the testator expressly provided that: 
"This provision for my wife shall be in lieu of 
and not in addition to her statutory interest in my 
estate granted by Section 2826 Compiled laws of 
Utah 1907" 
In the Kohn Estate case the appeal was after decree 
of final distribution and the court expressly found that 
the decree was entered pursuant to petition of the execu-
trix "in accordance with the will of the deceased" and that 
the executrix (widow) intended to and did waive her right 
to take under the statute and petitioned for distribution 
in accordance with the will and that decree of distribution 
was granted acco·rdingly. The court saying: 
"It was the duty of the executrix under the law to 
see to it that the estate was distributed in accord-
ance with the will rrhe presumption is that she ad-
ministered 'the estate in accordance with the 
provisions of the will' Hamilton v. Hamilton, HS 
Iowa, 127, 126 N.W. 776. When we thus compare 
the provisions of the will with the decree of dis-
tribution, we find them to be in perfect harmony, 
and the conclusion is therefore forced upon U8 
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t11at the widow not only intended to and did waive 
lier right to take under the statute, but elected to 
and did take under her husband's will. L"nless we 
disregard all rules of construction and all pre-
sumptions herein l'l'ferred to such conclusions 
seems inevitable." 
'J'hat dearly distinguishes the Kohn case from the 
(·ase at bar. Here the widow timely filed her declaration 
tlrnt she claimed both under the statute and under the 
"·ill, and that she ac<.'.epted the provisions o.f the will 
without renouncing or relinquishing her right in real 
('tibt<~ given by 8e<.'.. 7-1-4-3 of the Code. 
The holding of this court in ln Re Bullen's 1£state, 
+7 lJ tah 9G, 151 Pac. 533, should be considered in this 
connection : 
What the wife receives under section 2826 -
one-third in fee simple of all the legal and equit-
nble estate in real property possessed by the hus-
band during the coverture and not relinquished 
by her - she receives, not as an heir of her hus-
band, but in her own right, something which be-
longs to her absolutely, and of which she could 
not have been deprived by will or by any other 
voluntary act of her husband without her consent. 
LTnder that section, she is not an heir within the 
meaning of our intestate or succession statutes. 
'rhe court in that case quotes approvingly from the 
I\ebraska case of Estate of 8trahan 93 Neb. 828, 1-12 N.W. 
li/1-l, the following: 
"lt has been held by the great weight of authority 
that dower is not immune because it is dower, but 
because it, like the right to the homestead and to 
the distributive share of the widO"w of the estate 
of her deceased husband, belonged to hf'r inchoate-
11 
ly during hit> life, and vested fully in her at ]11 , 
death. 11he widow's share of the estate of ltl'i 
deceased husband, by the present inheritancL~ lm1, 
is given to her in lieu of dower, and it follO\rn that 
the interest of the appellant in her deceased 1111~ 
band's estate, both real and personal, comet> withi 11 
the test of immunity. Under the present statnt~ 
the wife takes her interest in the estate of her <ll· 
ceased husband by operation of law. She cannot 
be deprived of that interest by his will. It is SOllll' 
thing which belongs to her absolutely and ind1•-
pendently of any right of inheritante or succl'f 
sion. Strictly speaking, the widO\v's share should 
be considered as immune, rather than exenqJt, 
from an inheritance tax. lt iR free, rather tha11 
freed, from such tax. It is not excepted from tlll' 
taxable class, because it never was in such clas~. 
The rule declared in the Bullen case has been re-
peatedly followed by this court. In re Green's Est_ate, 7~ 
Utah 139, 142, 1 Pac. 2d 968; In re Reynolds' Estate 911 
Utah 415, 62 Pac~ 2d 270; In re Malan's Estate, 10 Utali 
2d. 22, 347 Pal.'A857, and Cardon v. Harper et al (?..~ 
Utah SJQ 151 Pac. 2d 99. 
ARGUMENT ON RESPONDENT'S CROS.S APPEAL 
The rate of tax to be assessed against the taxable 
portion of a decedent's estate is to· be determined frorn 
Section 59-12-2 Utah 1Code 1953 which is set forth at 
length on pages 22 and 23 of Appellant's Brief. The con-
troversy between the Commission and the executrix is a~ 
to the meaning to be given to the words in the third par-
agraph "but on the excest> of $-±0,000.00 the rate r;hall 
be as herein provided.'' The executrix contends that the 
wordt> ''as herein provided" connote "as in this sediun 
12 
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1111\'1d1·d" rather than ''m; in this paragraph provided." 
( '1·rUunly tl1e words should be read and construed in 
,·1111rn·etio11 with the whole section. \Vhen so construed 
1t is evident that the Legislature intended a three per 
(:1·nt rate on the first taxable bracket above the exemption. 
Lr not so construed then the Legislature gave a lower rate 
o I' tax on the first bracket above exemptions to collateral 
!teirn or strangers to the blood than it did to a surviving 
11 if(· and d1ildren. 
How can this be? Merely by noting that there is an 
1•'\1'lll1Jiion of $10,000.00 in favor of heirs and beneficiaries 
other than the spouse and children, and tha·t the tax on 
the first bra.cket above the exemption is at the rate of 
U1 rec per cent. The Tax Commission contends that in 
rnse of property passing to the spouse or children the 
t<L"X on the first bracket of taxable estate is five per cent. 
Can it he thought that the lawmakers intended such a 
\\'hittling down of the exemption °? Or that they would 
mtl'nd a higher rate of tax after exemptions on property 
11assing to a ·widow o·r children~ 
'l1he executrix submits that they did not, and that 
the consistent and reasonable view to take is that the 
Legislature meant that the rate of tax on the portion of 
an estate passing to a wife or children should be ac-
cording to the same graduated brackets set up in the 
~tahite, namely three per cent on the first $25,000 above 
""Prnption, then five per cent on the amount in excess 
of $:23,000 ::i hove the exemption up to $75,000. 
If this construction is not adopted then the para-
graph rPlating to the five per cent rate presents a defin-
13 
itely contradietory probh·w in aritlm1etic and 1::; uuvo~­
::;ible of any certainty of interpretation. 
"Five ver cent of the amount by which the e::;tatv 
exceed::; $25,000 but doe::; not exceed $75,000 except 
where property not exceeding in value the ::;urn ut 
$-±0,000 goes to the husband, wife or children . 
. . . then in such case the exemptions shall Ul' 
tl1t.• amount so going not to exceed $-±0,000, but 
on the exce::;::; of $-±0,000 the rate shall be a::; herein 
provided;" 
That paragraph ::;hould not be com;trued a::; a statute 
standing alone. Rather it should be read --with the entire 
section and with the reasonable view that the Legisla-
ture would not be more generous to collateral relatives 
or strangers to the blood than to the widow or children 
of a decedent. 
In this connection it may be asked what will be the 
result in case the court rules with the Commission and 
holds that the clause "but on the excess o.f $-1:0,000 the 
rate shall be as herein provided'' refers specifically to 
the five per cent rate mentioned in paragraph 3 and not 
to the graduated rates set forth in the whole section'? Will 
the Commission then be faced with the dilemma of allow-
ing the million-dollar estate to claim that the five per 
cent rate applies to all of the excess over $-10,000 passing 
to a spouse or children'? lt is a ::;word that may cut both 
ways, and before the court rule::; that "as herein provided" 
means "as hcre£n i11 tl1i:; paragraph provided," it doubt· 
lessly will consider carefully the whole section and the 
object and inknt of tlw h'g·i::;latorn and will as::;ume that 
they intended to make fully effective the PX-emption 
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gnutll·<i to a t:>urviving t:>pouse and (·hildren and did not 
miend to whittle do>n1 that exem1)tion or require them 
to pay GG-% per cent more tax on the first bracket of 
taxa\Jle estate than i8 requin~d of ('Ollateral heirs or 
.'lt rangers. 
Counsel for the 1'ax Conuni8sion relies upon the 
c.:at::<~ of In re \Valton's Estate 115 Utal1 160, 203 Pac. 2d 
J'J3. That case is not in point. It did not involve an estate 
ire l'Xeess of $-10,000 going to a wife, husband or children. 
Jt involved an estate of the stipulated value o.f $27,000, 
and the questions at issue as stated by Chief Justice 
Pratt on page 394: of 203 Pacific Reporter were these: 
L Does the term ''children" include grandchil-
dren; 
2. ls the life interest of the surviving son equiva-
lent to a tr an sf er to a surviving child, thus 
exempt; and 
:-i. What is the exemption which should be allowed 
under the section. 
']_'hat which i8 said in the opinion (or in the concur-
ring opinion of Mr. Justice Wolfe) relative to the rate 
of tax at five per cent on estates in excess of the $40,000 
exemption is clearly obiter dicta and is not binding in 
this ease where the issue is directly raised. It should be 
noted from Mr. Justice Wolf e's concuning opinion that 
he snid: "In this case, it i8 not necessary to determine 
\1 hat the rate would be if such property were in excess 
of $40;000 because the whole estate is only $27;000." 
Furthermore in the main opinion Chief J m;tice Pratt 
(_'(Jlllllll·nted on the fact that if the contention of the 1-'ax 
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Counuission on one (1uestion argued wen' upheld it 
would put the direct heirn of a decedent 'in a disadvan-
tageous vosition comvared with collateral heirs. 'l1hat i8 
the situation here if the Conm1ission's contention is su~­
tained. It will mean that a higher rate of tax is imposed 
upon a surviving wife on the first portion of the estate 
above the e.umptiun than would be imposed upon tht~ 
first portion of taxable estate going to a collateral heir 
or a stranger to the blood. 
On behalf of the executrix it is submitted that the 
Legislature never intended such result, and that the 
words in the act "but on the excess of $40,000 the rate 
shall be as herein provided" should be read in connection 
with the whole section and construed accordingly, rather 
than as if paragraph three stood alone. 
lt is obvious from the language above quoted from 
Chief Justice Pratt in the \V alton case that the Supreme 
Court would not favor a construction which would put 
a surviving wife or children of a decedent ''in a disad-
vantageous position compared with collateral heirs." It 
is also obvious that if paragraph three of the Sec. 59-12-2 
is read in connection with paragraph two - and with the 
realization that the Legislature would not intend to put 
a surviving spouse or children in a disadvantageous posi-
tion compared to collateral heirs or strangers to the 
blood then the contention asserted by the executrix herein 
is correct and should be sustained. 
'l1lie court will also note that it has repeatedly said 
that inheritance taxes are not property taxes but taxe~ 
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ttpoH the right to inherit, and that tmch taxe::; are strictly 
(·01drued agairrnt the taxing power. 
ln re Brown'::; Estate 3+ l"t. 73, 179 P. ()52 
Larson v. l\iad\J iller 5G U t. 84, 189 P. 579 
ln re Green'::; Estate 78 Ft. 139, 1-12; 1 Pac. 2d 968 
lf that rule of ::;trict con::;truction against the ta.'-ing 
po\\er i::; applied in con::;truing Section 59-12-2, with its 
u:st:> of the word::; "as herein provided" then clearly the 
eonkntion of the executrix herein should prevail. 
CONCLUSION 
la cmHJu::;ion re8pondent submits: 
l. 'l1he will of William Paxman is unainbiguous and 
:show::; an umni::;takable intent on the part of the testator 
to devise and bequeath all of his property to his wife if 
:she ::;urvived him, and without any intent to require her 
to relinquish the right given her by Section 74-4-3 to 
on1~-third of real estate owned by him during the lllB.l'-
r1age. 
2. Sections 7 4--l-3 and 7 4--l-4 are clear, certain and 
unambiguous and reference to administrative policies or 
Tax Commission practiee8 is wholly uncalled for and 
i nelevant. 
J. Testator's surv1vmg wife did not at any time 
waive or relinquish her statutory right in real estate and 
did clParly and unequivocally claim such right and also 
ht>r right to benefit of her husband's will. 
-1:. ~ection 59-12-2 is unclear, confusing and mcon-
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t'i:;knt unll':;b tht> eou:;trudion (•011kml<•d for h~- re::;po11 
dent iH adopted, but if :::;uch construdion i:::; adopted it i~ 
logical, rea::;onabll' and definitely eon8istent with the 
spirit and intent of the Legislatun• in granting a special 
exemption in favor of a surviving husband or wife or 
<'hildren of a decedent. 
Re8pondent and cross ap1Jellant tlwrefore sublllit~ 
that the order of the court approving the inheritance tax 
return should be approved and affirmed excepting in 
the matter of rate and amount of tax and a8 to that it 
should be :::;o modified a::; to approve the rate and amount 
of tax ::;et forth in the executrix's return. 
WILL L. HOY'r 
Attorney for Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant 
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